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The concept of justice is a matter of apprehension from the antiquity. It was John 
Rawls who all the way through his enduring dedication introduced the mainstream 
theory of justice in a radical manner. He was vocal against the classical utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism, Rawls opines, cannot offer a satisfactory account of basic rights and 
liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. It allows unacceptable trade-off among 
persons. With the influence of Kant’s deontological approach, Rawls offers the idea of 
justice as justitium. Noble-laureate Prof. Amartya Sen is indebted to Rawls while 
developing his contemporary idea of justice. He brings a new interpretation of justice 
that goes against Rawls. Rawls’ idea justitium is rule-based and deontological in 
nature, whereas Sen’s idea of justitia is consequential in nature. Rawls developed his 
idea of justice by invoking deontological approach of morality whereas Sen develops 
his idea of justice by invoking consequential approach of morality. Thus, the debate 
between Rawls and Sen is fascinating. They not only develop two polar concepts of 
justice but equally take support from two classical theories of morality, such as, 
deontological and consequential approaches of morality. 
Rawls interprets his idea of justice as fairness. Fairness is a demand for 
impartiality deeply associated with the idea of original position. Original position is the 
appropriate initial status- quo that ensures everything as fair. Thus Rawls, while 
developing his idea of justice as justitium, emphasizes more on just institutions rather 
than just societies. Sen, on the other hand, emphasizes more on just societies rather 
than just institutions. In this regard, Prof. Sen refers the two main characters of the 
great Indian Epic Mahabharata. In the Gita of Mahabharata, there we witness a fabled 
debate between Krishna (God) and Arjuna. Krishna talks in favour of justititum and 
differs from Arjuna who favors justitia. According to Sen, Arjuna is a prudent 
consequentialist because being a Khatriya, his virtue (svadhrama) is to take part in war. 
However, as a prudent consequentialist, he seriously thinks about the consequence of 
the war. He presumed that many more innocent peoples including his dearer and nearer 
would be killed in this great war. Rawls’ idea of justice as justitium is at par with the 
role of Krishna and Sen’s idea of justice as justitia is at par with the role of Arjuna. 
Rawls theory of justice as justitium actually hinges on two basic principles of justice 
which emphasise on the original position and impartiality preserved in terms of veil of 
ignorance. In this regard, Rawls voices in favor of institutional form of justice and 
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denies the possibility of global distributive justice. Rawls focuses on social primary 
goods, which society produces and which people can use. On the contrary, Sen, focuses 
more on the capability approach what people are able to do. Thus, Rawls’ theory of 
justice as justitium has been developed in terms of measuring primary goods. Contrary 
to this, Prof. Sen develops his idea of justice in terms of measuring capabilities of the 
individuals. Thus, the debate between Rawls and Sen regarding justice is enthralling in 
contemporary aspect. The main strategy of this paper is to explicate and examine the 
debate between Rawls and Sen from global perspective. The paper, at last, attempts to 
explore with critical outlook whether the debate actually creates a substantive gulf 




Although the concept of justice has taken a dramatic turn in postmodern era, there is 
nothing wrong in assuming that the contemporary idea of justice is the outcome of a 
perpetual revision of the concept of justice from Greek tradition. In the editor’s 
forwarded of The Concept of Justice of N.M.L. Nathan, W. D. Hudson said, “To arrive 
at a correct understanding of justice has been the aim of moral and political philosophy 
from Greek antiquity to our own day.” (Hudson, 1971) 
I think the root of the system of modern justice, in some sense or other, finds its 
foothold in Hebrews, carried through the Greeks and Romans and in turn subsequently 
transmitted in the West and the other parts of the world. In fact, we find a 
comprehensive idea of justice in Plato’s Republic. In Book 4, 434c, Plato says, “Justice 
is harmony” and again in his Book 4, 443b, he says, “Justice is doing one’s own job.” 
More importantly, Plato conceived justice both in terms of soul as well as in terms of 
state. Plato says, “Justice exists in a state as well as in an individual, because a state is 
simply the lives of its citizens ‘and if we find that society in a natural expression of 
men’s natures, we may conclude that social justice is the natural expression of the 
justice in men’s soul.” (Plato, 1961, xxxi) Justice, for Plato, is a human virtue that 
eventually makes a society internally harmonious and good at large. Justice, being an 
assemblage of elements, indeed reveals a degree of integration and unity on account of 
the integrity of a neighborhood. In this sense, there is nothing wrong to claim, of 
course, from a general perspective that justice is a map of that neighborhood.  
(Schmidtz, 2006, 3) Justice means what is just and it has something, of course with 
certain exception, to do with treating like cases alike and hence is associated with the 
principle of generalization. Aristotle says, “Justice is thought to be equality; and so it 
is, but for equals, not for everybody. Inequality is also thought to be just; and so it is, 
but for unequals, not for everybody.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1280a9) Aristotle, of course, 
emphasized proportionate equality based on the principle of treating ‘similar similarly 
and dissimilar dissimilarly’. Having said this, the contemporary debate between Rawls 
and Sen regarding the very nature of justice is philosophically absorbing. Therefore, in 
the subsequent sequels, we propose to develop, in order, Rawls’s theory of justice as 
Justitium, then Sen’s idea of justice as Justitia and finally make a comparative study 
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between Rawls and Sen in my own rationale towards preconceiving whether the gulf as 
presumed between Justitium and Justitia, is at all fundamental in nature or not. 
                            
II. Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Justitum 
 
Even though the impact of the idea of justice of Plato, Socrates and Aristotle is colossal 
on the modern interpretation of justice, but honestly speaking, it was John Rawls who 
indeed introduced the mainstream idea of justice. Rawls’ idea of justice is ground-
breaking because while developing his theory of justice as justitium, he denies 
utilitarianism as the criterion of justice on one hand and affirms deontological approach 
as the criterion of justice on the other. In the form of an admiration, Rawls ’Harvard 
colleague, Robert Nozick says, “A theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-
ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy which has not seen its like 
since the writings of John Stuart Mill.” (Nozick, 1974, 183) In fact, it was John Rawls 
who in his book A Theory of Justice has ingrained the ditch of modern interpretation of 
the idea of justice. His idea of justice is a cascade of illuminating ideas, integrated 
together into a lovely whole. Rawls’ theory of justice as Justitium is guided by his two 
basic principles of justice. These are as follows: 
The First Principle of Justice 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (the principle of equal 
liberty). 
The Second Principle  
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so far they are both: 
(a) Attached to offices and positions open to all under the conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity (the principle of fair equality of opportunity). 
(b) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle (the difference principle). 
The first principle is the principle of equal liberty which, according to Rawls, is a must 
for all without exception. The second principle contains two parts. The first part of the 
second principle is known as the principle of fair equality of opportunity. It is 
concerned with the institutional requirement of making sure that public opportunities 
are open to all irrespective of caste, race, religion, etc. The second part of the second 
principle is known as Difference Principle. It is concerned with distributive equity as 
well as overall efficiency and it is particularly taken care of the worst-off members of 
the society.  
The main contention of Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium is to secure a higher 
level of intellection on the basis of generalization in Locke, Rousseau and Kant. In this 
regard, Rawls intuits a well-ordered (just) society as the basic structure in the initial 
(original) position which is purely hypothetical in nature. A just society, Rawls intuits, 
is a basic platform of human association where every person comes to know what he 
actually is; it is a kind of society based on shared conception of justice along with the 
underlying promise of civil friendship. Everyone enjoys equal liberty without exception 
in the original or initial position. Any agreement that would be made in the initial 
position would be fair in terms of equality what Rawls termed as justice as fairness. 
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This is made possible because the principles of justice are chosen behind the veil of 
ignorance. As a result, ‘no one in the original position knows his place in society, no 
one knows his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.” 
(Rawls, 1971, 12) Thus, the veil of ignorance of Rawls would certainly be an effective 
means in the original position as it removes differences in the original position and in 
turn making justice as justice as fairness. As a result, the original position is supposed 
to be the most philosophically favored interpretation of a hypothetical status-quo in 
which fundamental agreements would be fair. The parties of the well-ordered or just 
society in the original position under the veil of ignorance are mutually disinterested as 
they are, so to speak, neither philanthropic, nor resentful. Thus, Rawls’s main objective 
is to show in what sense the well-ordered (just) society in the initial or original position 
can function under the veil of ignorance through fair agreements. The theory of justice 
as justitium is guided by universal and unconditional rules and principle in the 
line of deontology of Kant only with the exception of Difference Principle which 
deals inequalities within the constraint of justice. Further, Rawls’ theory of justice 
as justitium is absolute in the sense that it represents, in some sense or other, 
transcendental institutionalism with the perception of arranged-focused view of 
justice. It states that there will be a unanimous choice of a unique set of two 
principles of justice in a hypothetical situation of primordial equality  where 
parties’ vested interests are set aside under the veil of ignorance.  
 
III. Sen’s Idea of Justice as Justitia 
 
Amartya Sen, even if is obligated to Rawls, introduces the idea of justice as justitia and 
in this regard, Sen affirms utilitarianism (consequentialism) at length and denies 
deontological approach as the foundation of justice as justitia. Sen develops his idea of 
justice as justitia as an alternative approach by way of criticizing Rawls’ theory of 
justice as jusitium. While developing his idea of justice as justitia, Sen, at the very 
outset, departs from Rawls on two important accounts just by criticising his 
contractarian or transcendental approach of justice.  
First, Sen criticizes Rawls’ idea of transcendental institutionalism of justice that 
has been developed within the background of Kantian deontology; and secondly, he 
equally departs from Rawls’ view of just institutions and rules. As far as transcendental 
institutionalism is concerned, Sen finds two problems in Rawls’ theory of justice. First, 
he thinks that there is no reasoned argument in transcendental approach of justice as 
justitium even though Rawls imposes some stringent conditions, such as, impartiality, 
open minded scrutiny on the nature of just society in the initial position. Thus, for Sen, 
Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism lacks reasoned viability in the initial position of 
a well-order society what Rawls terms it as “just society”. The other problem is the 
problem of redundancy crafting from the attempt of transcendental solution that indeed 
is not transcendental at all. Sen, then, terms these two problems as the problem of 
feasibility and redundancy. The second departure of Sen from Rawls is primarily 
concerned with the position that unlike Rawls, Sen does not emphasize on just 
institutions and rules, but to effort mainly on actual realizations and accomplishments. 
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Sen, then, attributes Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism as an arranged-focused 
view of justice and his own position has been termed as a realized focused view of 
justice. He then relates the dichotomy between ‘an arranged- focused view of justice’ 
and “a realisation–focused understanding of justice”. (Ibid. 10) According to Sen, an 
arranged-focused view of justice is the outcome of justitium whereas his realisation–
focused understanding of justice is the outcome of justitia. 
Sen further contends that Rawls’ position of justitium in the form of arranged- 
focused view of justice guided by two unique set of principles of justice in the initial 
position under the purview of veil of ignorance actually hinges on mistake. Sen, in this 
regard, goes on to say that one should not overlook the differences of distributional 
equality on one hand and overall or aggregate enhancement on the other. Now, as far 
his development of arranged-focused view of justice is concerned, Rawls gives 
prominence on transcendental identification just by focusing on the lexicographic 
maxim rule (Ibid. 11) among many other available convincing alternatives for 
achieving impartial attention in the initial position of the well-order society.  However, 
in doing so, Rawls, Sen opines, sets aside, without giving sufficient reasons, many 
other supposed reasoned differences associated with his two principles of justice. 
Interestingly, while developing arranged-focused view of justice in the initial position, 
Rawls indeed does not rule out the available possible alternatives, but to set aside 
everything in the initial position by imposing the metaphor ‘the veil of ignorance’. 
This, in fact, I think, is a matter of temporary suspension of the alternative possibilities 
in the just society, because after conceptualizing initial position in the just society 
Rawls introduces his second principle of justice of which the second part, being a 
Difference Principle, acknowledges the possibility of inequalities on the basis of 
merits, talents, least advantage, better-off, etc. The difficulty, Sen reveals, I do believe, 
in Rawls’ position is to find out whether the plurality of reasons for justice as fairness 
would, in fact, allow one set of principles of justice to surface in the original position of 
just society. If it does and the possibility is very much there, Sen claims, then Rawls’ 
position of transcendental institutionalism as an arranged-focused view of justice 
would be at stake at its introduction.  
Though, Rawls intuits the possibility of a unique transcendental promise in his 
theory of justice as fairness, but Sen expresses serious reservation about its unique 
impartiality. In this regard, Sen gives us an illustration of a flute of three children. 
Anne, Bob and Carla are three children who are involved in a quarrel of taking hold of 
a flute on the basis of Rawls’ principle of justice as fairness. Now, Anne claims that 
she deserves the flute because she alone knows how to play it. As the very objective of 
a flute is to play, she deserves it prior to others. In an alternative situation, Bob claims 
that he deserves the flute as he is poorer (least-off) than the others and the flute should 
give the poorest or least advantageous to play. In another set up, it is Carla who claims 
that she deserves the flute because she has been working industriously for a 
considerable period to make the flute with her own effort. Now, Sen’s position, at this 
juncture, is that if anybody would take note of the standpoint of Anne, Bob and Carls 
separately, then , of course, even within the purview of Rawls’ theory of justice as 
justitium, he would think that their respective entitlement is justified and indeed strong 
enough in seizing the flute in their own stride. However, theorists of different 
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inducements perhaps may take their own standpoint to identify the right person. From 
economic egalitarian perspective, Bob certainly deserves the flute because its main 
objective is to minimize gap in the economic means of people. From libertarian 
perspective, Carla, being a maker of the flute, certainly deserves it. Again, from the 
utilitarian hedonistic point of view, Anne certainly deserves the flute because she is the 
only one who can play the flute and by virtue of doing it she gains happiness. 
I think the egalitarian position of Bob has well been supported by the Difference 
Principle of Rawls’ in which preferential treatment can be justified on the ground of 
economic condition. Out of these three perspectives, such as, economic egalitarianism, 
liberalism and utilitarianism, liberalism, for Sen, is unconditional as, like utilitarianism, 
it does not pay attention on individual happiness; rather unlike utilitarianism, it pays 
attention on person’s right. Sen, however, thinks that it would indeed be difficult to 
show how Rawls fulfils the possible plurality of competing principles as non-
transcendental alternatives as discussed in the case of flute can be accommodated 
within the straight jacket of his transcendental approach of justice. Transcendental 
alternative, Sen claims, in any sense of imagination, does not offer ‘a solution to the 
problem of comparisons between any two non-transcendental alternatives’. (Sen, 2009, 
13) 
According to Sen, Rawls’ theory of justice, being a transcended institutionalism, 
does not bear any concrete sense on comparative assessment. In fact, apart from 
intellectual interest, it does not endure any undeviating significance to the problem of 
choice. On one hand, Rawls intuits transcendental institutionalism and on the other 
hand, he talks in favor of social justice with the inducement of Difference Principle that 
deals with inequalities. Sen, in this regard, says that it would not be possible to choose 
between a Picasso and a Dali, one cannot make it out even in the transcendental 
institutionalism simply for the reason that the ideal picture of the world is neither a 
Picasso nor a Dali, but Mona Lisa. Sen says, “If a theory of justice is to guide reasoned 
choice of politics, strategies and institutions, then the identification of fully just social 
arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient.” (Ibid. 15) Even though it would be 
interesting to hear, but the very fact, Sen reveals, is that neither of this picture belongs 
to the world. I think the anxiety of Sen actually hinges on the very question: Does 
transcendental institutionalism of Rawls indeed being capable of identifying 
transcendental alternative? If it does, how do we realize it? According to Sen, Rawls’ 
theory of justice actually fails to identify even transcendental alternative because any 
forms of alternative are measured in terms of their respective closeness to the perfect 
choice with the hope that even transcendental identification indirectly gives rise to a 
ranking of alternatives. Thus for Sen, Rawls’ theory of justice as justice as fairness 
falls short on two important accounts as it is neither confined to the choice of 
institutions as it has been promised to be; nor to satisfactory with regard to the 
identification of ideal social arrangements. A theory of justice, in the true sense of the 
term, must be accountable to humans. Rawls’ theory of justice, being a transcended 
institutionalism, fails to do this as it is indifferent to the lives of people. Rawls’ gives 
emphasis more on the institutions, but the fact is that human lives, experiences and 
realizations cannot be augmented by institutional rules and principles. 
Sen’s Concrete Proposal of Justice as Justitia 
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While delineating the subtle distinction between an arranged-focused and a 
realisation-focused view of justice, Sen invokes an old fashioned distinction between 
niti and nyaya from classical Indian Sanskrit literature. In classical Sanskrit literature, 
both the terms niti and nyaya stand for justice. According to Sen, the ethical term niti 
(principle) has been conceived as the weapon of organizational decorum and 
behavioural correctness and hence is associated with arranged-focused view of justice. 
On the contrary, nyaya, being an ethical term, is linked with the comprehended world 
and thus is associated with the realisation-focused view of justice. In this regard, Sen 
invokes the relevance of the metaphor matsyanyaya. The metaphor matsyanyaya 
actually means ‘justice in the world of fish’ where the big fish of the pond can nip the 
small fishes of the pond. If it does, then how do we control the will of the big fish of 
the pond? Like the big fish of the pond, there are many big guys in our society who can 
exploit, extinct and subjugate in manifold of ways the marginalized people, the 
disabled, the down-trodden even within the regulating system of the state. Thus, the 
fundamental objective of justice is to resist the will of matyanyaya in our society in 
order to make sure that the justice of fish cannot overrun the world of human beings. In 
this regard, Sen voices in favor of nyaya because he feels that “realisation of justice in 
the sense of nyaya is not just a matter of judging institutions and rules, but of judging 
the societies themselves”.  (Ibid. 21) Having said this, if there remains the possibility in 
our society where a big fish could still nip a small fish at will, then, of course, it would 
be a patent violation of human justice as nyaya.  
In this regard, Sen refers two important characters of Krishna and Arjuna of the 
great Indian epic Gita of Mahabharata. Here Sen intuits the role of Krishna as a 
deontologist and the role of Arjuna as a prudent consequentialist. As a deontologist, 
Krishna (God) advices everything in accordance with rules (Dharma). Now, on the eve 
of the battle when the unconquerable worrier, Arjuna being a Kshatriya, expresses 
serious reservation of taking part in the battle by conceiving it prudently that the 
consequence of the battle will lead many killings of his dearer and nearer, Krishna, 
being a mentor, persistently insists Arjuna that being a Kshatriya he (Arjuna) should 
take part in the battle because it is his Svadharma, i.e., the essence of every Kshatriya. 
As far as niti (principle/maxim) is concerned, Arjuna, being a Kshatriya, should take 
part in the battle and as far as nyaya is concerned, he should think of the consequence 
of the battle. Thus, considering the two forms of justice at random, Arjuna falls in a 
dilemma. (Ibid. 22) While delineating his idea of justice as justita in the line of prudent 
consequentialism, Sen here makes a stunning contrast by characterizing Krishna as a 
deontologist and Arjuna as a prudent consequentialist. Krishna, being a deontologist, 
accentuates on uninfringeable moral maxims (nitis) which are universal, absolute and 
supreme in nature. On the contrary, Arjuna, being a prudent consequentialist, thinks 
about the consequence of the battle in terms of reasoned or ground reality (nyaya). In 
this regard, Professor Sen Says, “The ground debate is often interpreted as one about 
deontology verses consequentialism, with Krishna, the deontologist, urging Arjuna to 
do his duty, while Arjuna, the alleged consequentialist, worries about the terrible 
consequence of the war.” (Ibid. 23) 
Even though both niti and nyaya stand for justice in classical Sanskrit, but 
according to Sen, nitis (principles) are organizational or institutional property and are 
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being used for behavioral correctness. On the contrary, nyaya stands for ‘a 
comprehensive concept of realized justice’. (Ibid. 24) For Sen, realization in the sense 
of nyaya is a matter of judging the societies themselves and if a big fish goes on 
oppressing a small fish at will just like the case of matsyanyaya, then it must be a 
patent violence of justice as nyaya. 
Observation 
The on-going debate between Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium and Sen’s idea 
of justice as justitia, I think, is philosophically relevant in the sense it reflects the socio- 
eco-political issues of our surroundings. Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium bangs 
more on the role of institutions. In this regard, Rawls denies utilitarianism and favors 
deontological approach. Sen, on the other hand, repudiates deontology in the strict 
sense of the term and favors consequentialism in the form of welfarism where 
individual prudency takes the upper hand. Now, the pertinent question that needs to be 
taken care of at this juncture is that whether there underlies any substantive gulf 
between Rawls’ understandings of the theory of justice as justitium and Sen’s 
understanding of the theory of justice as justitia. Are these two approaches mutually 
exclusive in nature? Even though the outlook of Rawls and Sen is different as far as 
their respective interpretation of the idea of justice is concerned, but certainly they are 
not mutually exclusive. Rawls, being a socio-political philosopher, has emphasized 
more the institutional form of justice, and in this regard, he gives more importance to 
rules and principles along with the line of the deontological approach. In this regard, 
Rawls has been influenced by Kantian deontology. On the other hand, Sen, being a 
moral philosopher of welfare economy, stresses development ethics and in this regard, 
he emphasizes the practical aspect of the concept of justice. As a proponent of ethics 
and economics, Sen takes the insight of utilitarianism in the form of consequentialism. 
He then claims that his interpretation of utilitarianism would be a prudent one, and in 
this regard he has mentioned the role of Arjuna of Gita of Mahabharata as the model 
of prudent consequentialist. 
There is no question of doubt that Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium is 
deontological in nature. In this sense, Rawls was indebted to Kant and others as well. I 
believe Sen’s anxiety regarding Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium actually hinges on 
its practical inapplicability. If it does, and perhaps if I am not wrong to read Sen 
properly, then Sen’s position would really be unfair to Rawls. In fact, Rawls in his later 
writings, particularly in his The Laws of People, Political Liberalism etc., offers us 
many aspects that would be useful as far as our understanding of social justice is 
concerned. Of course, Sen is right in sensing Krishna as a deontologist in the sagacity 
of Rawls and Arjuna as a prudent consequentialist in his own intellect, but the very fact 
is that when the tussle arises between a deontologist and a consequentialist, in our case 
between Krishna and Arjuna, the ultimate winner would be the deontologist, but not the 
consequentialist as it had happened in the Mahabharata. Perhaps Professor Sen agrees 
with me that in India we have too much niti and too little nyaya. Unlike nyaya, niti 
endures enormous appeal as it encompasses all. In the Gita of Mahabharata, Arjuna’s 
doubts should not be dismissed in the way Krishna dismissed them. However, Krishna, 
being a deontologist (niti person) did not make Arjuna’s fight as a war or battle and kill 
people. The war was plunge on the Pandavas because justice has been denied for them. 
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In fact, Krishna answered the doubt of Arjuna in the logical and spiritual way. The 
doubt of Arjuna were not on the issue of whether to fight or not; rather it is primarily 
concerned with how he would feel when he would be killing people with whom he 
grew up with, people who taught him so much in his life etc. Having said this, Sri 
Krishna repeatedly pointed out to Arjuna that it was his duty to fight for justice; 
otherwise intimidators would have had a field day in terrorizing the people as it would 
happen in the case of matsyanyaya 
Now, let me remind Gandhi in this regard. Apparently, Gandhi was a deontologist 
in the sense that he introduced the theory of Sarvodaya which includes all without 
exception. In fact, Gandhi severely critized the utilitarianism approach on the basis it 
denies the interest of the minorities in proportion, and it is very much the same as 
Rawls does against utilitarianism. Thus, the position of Rawls and Gandhi about the 
limitation of utilitarianism would remain the same. The point which haunts me the 
most is: how does Gandhi support Krishna who has insisted Arjuna to engage in a 
battle leading towards violence (himsa)? Gandhi’s concept of Sarvodaya is based on 
the concept of non-violence or ahimsa in the true sense of the term. Now, if Sen would 
read the battle of Mahabharata in terms of severe conflict and violence, then certainly, 
Gandhi could not support the position of Krishna of Gita of Mahabharata. But the very 
fact is that Gandhi supported Krishna in this regard. Does it then lead us to assume 
Gandhi had made a mistake in supporting Krishna? If we stand with Sen, then perhaps 
the answer is yes, as Sen puts emphasis more on ground reality. On the contrary, if we 
stand with Rawls, then the answer would be negative, because in such a case 
everything would be determined in accordance with moral rules and principles. As we 
all know the Gandhian concept of justice is at par with his very concept of truth 
(sat/satya). Thus, for Gandhi to fight for justice is to fight for truth (truth=justice). 
Now, if Krishna insisted Arjuna realize the war of Mahabharata not as a mere war or 
battle, but a means to fight for justice, then there is nothing wrong on the part of 
Gandhi to take the side of Krishna. If it does, then how do we retain Gandhi’s concept 
of non-violence (ahimsa) in the battlefield of Mahabharata? We can perhaps tackle 
this problem by bringing the Vedanta’s concept of Maya (illusion) and Braham 
(reality). We can then say that in appearance it would seem there is a serious conflict 
and violence in the battlefield of Mahabharata. Yet, in the real sense, it is an illusion, 
because it is not a battle, but a means and the only means to fight for justice (truth) 
where there is no conflict or non-violence. 
What then can I embrace regarding Rawls and Sen? Do I mean to say that Rawls is 
right and Sen is wrong or vice-versa? I think as far as their development of the theory 
or idea of justice is concerned, they invoke different outlooks. Even though Rawls’ 
theory of justice is deontological in nature, but his main intention was to establish a 
well-ordered society in the initial position on the basis of the principle of equal liberty. 
Sen’s main objection against Rawls is that as a theory of justice as justitium, Rawls’s 
theory of justice like Kantian morality is absolute, ideal, transcendental lacking practice 
utility in solving social-economic inequalities happening in our surroundings. I think 
Sen perhaps is wrong in this regard. Rawls, I think, while developing his theory of 
justice, intuits at the very outset a well-ordered society in the original position under 
the veil of ignorance where the basic liberty to all is ensured. This was Rawls’ 
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conceptual vision or conceptual structure at the starting point of his theory of justice at 
the original position in a well-ordered society. As a theory there is nothing wrong. 
Therefore, it would not be prudent or fair to nullify the relevance of Rawls’ theory of 
justice as justitium by tagging it with the notion of absolute transcendentalism. 
According to Sen, even though Rawls’ theory of justice as Justitium being a 
transcendental institutionalism is primarily concerned with reason or rationality in the 
real sense of the term, but there is indeed lacking reasoned viability in Rawls’ 
transcendental institutionalism. We think this is also unfair. By denying the position of 
Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium, Sen actually rips to pieces so many other well-
established humanitarian and classical ethical theories, such as the deontological 
approach of Kant and the Sarvodaya concept of Gandhi. Interestingly, Gandhi while 
developing his theory of Sarvodaya denies utilitarian principle: “Greatest good of the 
greatest numbers”. As a moral philosopher and welfare economist, Sen has a point to 
say in favor of utilitarianism in the articulate manner of “prudent consequentialism”. In 
fact, there is no available moral theory at out hand that may cohere with welfare 
economy except utilitarianism. However, as a moral philosopher, Sen is much harsh 
and antagonistic in evaluating Rawls’ theory of justice as justitium. Sen perhaps 
overlooks the social implication of Rawls’ second part of second principle known as 
“Difference Principle”, which we think has a close proximity to Sen’s vision of 
welfarism. Even we do not find anything wrong in conceiving Rawls’ difference 
Principle as much as close or at par with Sen’s welfarism in terms of prudent 
consequentialism. The very objective of utilitarianism in general and Sen’s prudent 
consequentialism in particular will remain obscure so long it has not been delimited by 
deontological view of justice. If it does, then the gulf between Rawls’ theory of justice 
as justitium and Sen’s idea of justice as justitia is minimum. They are mutually 
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